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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents a novel question in this court of 
whether the "insurance business" exception found in the 
National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") Code of 
Arbitration Procedure precludes arbitration of employment 
disputes that implicate insurance issues.1  
 
I. Background 
 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
 
Certain questionable sales practices of the Prudential 
Insurance Company of America ("Prudential") gave rise to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court relied on diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. S 1332, 
and federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. S 1331, to entertain 
plaintiffs' state law claims and causes of action under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. SS 1961- 
1968. We exercise jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 
U.S.C. SS 16(a)(1)(A) and 16(a)(1)(C). Because this appeal presents a 
legal 
question concerning the applicability and scope of an arbitration 
agreement, our standard of review is plenary. See Pritzker v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 7 F.3d 1110, 1113 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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several lawsuits against it by former employees.2 Plaintiffs 
are former Prudential sales agents who brought suit 
alleging that Prudential took adverse employment action 
against them in alleged retaliation for their refusal to 
participate in the company's insurance sales fraud. In 
response to the plaintiffs' action, Prudential moved, under 
section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, to compel 
arbitration of plaintiffs' claims. Prudential relied upon the 
fact that each plaintiff had signed a Uniform Application for 
Securities Industry Registration or Transfer ("Form U-4") 
which incorporated by reference the arbitration provisions 
of the NASD Code. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, 
arguing that Prudential could not invoke Form U-4 because 
it is not a party to that agreement, and, in the alternative, 
that the Code contains an exception for disputes involving 
the "insurance business" which would preclude arbitration 
in this case. 
 
Upon considering the contested motion, the district court 
held that Prudential could seek to enforce the arbitration 
agreement even though it is not a signatory to Form U-4. 
Having ruled that Form U-4 applied to the appropriate 
parties, the court addressed whether the arbitration 
agreement covered the legal claims pressed by the 
plaintiffs. Interpreting the scope of the agreement embodied 
in Form U-4, the court found that the relevant language 
applied to the plaintiffs' causes of action. 
 
Finally, the court examined the insurance business 
exception, which would potentially exempt arbitration in 
this case. While recognizing a liberal federal policy in favor 
of arbitration, the court nevertheless held that the 
exception applied on the ground that plaintiffs' claims are 
"intricately related" to Prudential's insurance business. It 
added that the looming class action suits against 
Prudential may raise the same issues as those subject to 
arbitration. This consideration, in the district court's view, 
compelled a finding favoring the application of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. These lawsuits were consolidated with actions brought by Prudential 
policyholders before the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1407. 
Because Prudential sought to compel arbitration only against the 
plaintiffs, the policyholder claims are not before us in this proceeding. 
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exception. Accordingly, the court denied Prudential's 
motion under the Arbitration Act. This appeal followed. 
 
B. The Arbitration Provisions 
 
The resolution of the issues in this appeal first calls for 
a parsing of the relevant documentation and, in particular, 
the language of Form U-4 itself.3 This form provides that 
the applicant agreed to: 
 
       arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may 
       arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any 
       other person, that is required to be arbitrated under 
       the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the ...[NASD] as 
       may be amended from time to time. 
 
Form U-4 further states that each applicant will: 
 
       abide by, comply with, and adhere to all the provisions, 
       conditions and covenants of the statutes, constitutions, 
       certificates of incorporation, by-laws and rules and 
       regulations of the ... [NASD] as they are and may be 
       adopted, changed or amended from time to time.... 
 
Incorporated by reference through these two provisions is 
the NASD Code of Arbitration. Part I Section One of the 
Code articulates which matters are eligible for arbitration: 
 
       any dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or in 
       connection with the business of any member of the 
       [NASD], or arising out of the employment or 
       termination of employment of associated persons(s) 
       with any member, with the exception of disputes 
       involving the insurance business of any member which 
       is also an insurance company: 
 
       (1) between or among members; 
 
       (2) between or among members and associated 
       persons; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The relevant language at issue refers to the most current Form U-4 
and the NASD Code of Arbitration, as amended in 1993. Although the 
plaintiffs had argued before the district court that the pre-1993 Code of 
Arbitration applied, they do not raise that contention on appeal. 
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       (3) between or among members or associated persons 
       and public customers, or others; and 
 
       (4) between or among members, registered clearing 
       agencies with which the [NASD] has entered into 
       an agreement to utilize the [NASD] arbitration 
       facilities and procedures, and participants, 
       pledges, or other persons using the facilities of a 
       registered clearing agency, as these terms are 
       defined under the rules of such a registered 
       clearing agency. 
 
Part II Section 8 of the Code mandates arbitration for "[a]ny 
dispute, claim, or controversy eligible for submission under 
Part I of this Code between or among members and/or 
associated persons...." 
 
All the plaintiffs signed Form U-4 as a condition 
precedent to their employment at Prudential.4 Prudential, 
however, is not a signatory to the agreement.5 Rather, the 
"firm" identified in Form U-4, is Pruco Securities Corp., a 
wholly-owned Prudential subsidiary. 
 
II. Arbitration 
 
A. Prudential's Standing  
 
A threshold inquiry under the Federal Arbitration Act is 
to determine, under recognized principles of contract law, 
the validity of, and the parties bound by, the arbitration 
agreement. As explained by the Supreme Court, 
" `arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be 
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has 
not agreed so to submit.' " AT&T Technologies v. 
Communications Workers of America, et al., 475 U.S. 643, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note that plaintiffs Martin and Schulte signed an earlier version of 
Form U-4, which differed slightly from the agreement signed by the 
remaining plaintiffs. The provisions at issue in this appeal, however, are 
materially identical. 
 
5. The Form U-4 agreement is more correctly understood as between the 
plaintiffs and the NASD. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2. (1985). 
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648 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. 
Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)). 
The identification of the parties bound by the agreement to 
arbitrate need not be confined to the limited inquiry of 
identifying the signatories to the arbitration agreement. 
Rather, the dispositive finding is an " `express' and 
`unequivocal' " agreement between parties to arbitrate their 
disputes. Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 
1503, 1512 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted), aff'd, 514 
U.S. 938 (1995). 
 
As this court has previously recognized, "a variety of non- 
signatories of arbitration agreements have been held to be 
bound by such agreements under ordinary common law 
contract and agency principles." Barrowclough v. Kidder, 
Peabody & Co., Inc., 752 F.2d 923, 938 (1985) (citations 
omitted), overruled on other grounds by Pritzker v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1112 (3d 
Cir. 1993). Indeed, courts have been willing to apply third 
party beneficiary law in examining the contractual standing 
of a non-signatory party to a dispute, provided there is an 
expression of the requisite intent between the third party 
and the plaintiff to arbitrate their claims. See McPheeters v. 
McGinn, Smith & Co., 953 F.2d 771, 772-73 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(per curiam); Nesslage v. York Sec., Inc., 823 F.2d 231, 233- 
34 (8th Cir. 1987); Letizia v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 
802 F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 1986); Mowbray v. Moseley, 
Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 795 F.2d 1111, 
1116-17 (1st Cir. 1986); Stone v. Pennsylvania Merchant 
Group, Ltd., 949 F.Supp. 316, 320-21 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 
 
The parties in this case do not contest the validity of the 
arbitration clause itself. Rather, they dispute the identity of 
the parties bound by Form U-4.6 At the outset, we do not 
find Prudential is without standing here simply because it 
is not a signatory to the arbitration argument; nor will we 
deny standing because Pruco is listed as the only"firm" 
referenced in Form U-4. Instead, we turn to the text of the 
Form U-4 arbitration agreement to see if there is an express 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The parties raise this issue in response to this court's direction to 
address the significance, if any, of Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 
F.3d 
1287 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 583 (1996), to this case. 
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and unequivocal intent that the plaintiffs would arbitrate 
their claims against, inter alia, Prudential, and whether 
"both parties to the contract express an intention to benefit 
the third party in the contract itself...." Scarpitti v. Weborg, 
530 Pa. 366, 372-73, 609 A.2d 147, 150 (1992); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 302(1)(b) (1981). 
 
As stated in Form U-4, the plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate 
any dispute not only with Pruco, but also with "any other 
person" where the claim itself would be subject to 
arbitration under the NASD Code. Pursuant to section 8 of 
the NASD Code, plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate certain 
disputes "between or among members and/or associated 
persons...." There is no question that Prudential is a 
member of the NASD, and the plaintiffs are associated 
persons within the meaning of the Code.7  Thus, we 
conclude, as did the district court, there is a clear and 
unequivocal intent to arbitrate claims with third parties 
such as Prudential, and not just Pruco, to the extent they 
are eligible for arbitration under S 1. Cf. Armijo v. Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America, 72 F.3d 793, 799 n.7 (10th Cir. 
1995) (finding an intent to arbitrate with Prudential as well 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. An "associated person" is defined as: 
 
       every sole proprietor, partner, officer, director, or branch 
manager of 
       any member, or any natural person occupying a similar status or 
       performing similar functions, or any natural person engaged in the 
       investment banking or securities business who is directly or 
       indirectly controlling or controlled by such member.... 
 
NASD By-Laws P 1101(q). We find no merit to plaintiff Young's argument 
that he is not an "associated person" within the meaning of the NASD 
Code. Indeed, Young's entire theory of recovery is premised on the fact 
that he was a Prudential employee with authority to trade in securities. 
Young would certainly be an "associated person" for purposes of the 
Securities Exchange Act, which uses similar language as the NASD's 
definition and provides the statutory basis for the NASD. See 15 U.S.C. 
S 78c(a)(21); Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1517; Cular v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 
961 F.Supp. 550, 556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Even if Young, as an 
employee, is not an associated person for purposes of the NASD 
definition, his degree of involvement in these disputes would, at the very 
least, place him as a "certain other" under Section 8 of the NASD Code. 
See Thomas James Associates, Inc. v. Jameson, 102 F.3d 60, 67-68 (2d 
Cir. 1996). 
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as Pruco through the maintenance of registration with 
Prudential). 
 
Moreover, it is clear from the text and purpose of Form 
U-4, that the parties to the agreement intended to benefit 
such non-signatory, third parties as Prudential. While Form 
U-4 is only an agreement between the NASD and the 
applicant, it was adopted as a broader effort by self- 
regulatory organizations, including the NASD, to regulate 
the securities industry.8 See 1 Ian R. MacNeil, et al., 
Federal Arbitration Law: Agreements, Awards, and 
Remedies under the Federal Arbitration Act S 13, at 3-8, 
43-44 (1996); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and 
Voluntary Consent, 25 Hofstra L.Rev. 83, 146 (1996). The 
intention, as Form U-4 unambiguously indicates, was not 
limited to arbitrating disputes between the NASD and the 
applicant or member "firms" explicitly recognized in the 
text. Rather, the arbitration agreement and the NASD Code 
of Arbitration establish certain classes of individuals -- 
member firms of the NASD, customers, and so on -- who 
would benefit from the applicant's agreement with the 
NASD. The applicant, in return, would become a registered 
broker with the NASD and could properly conduct business 
under the federal securities laws. Therefore, we have no 
doubts that the parties to Form U-4 unequivocally intended 
that each applicant would submit to arbitration against 
non-signatory third parties such as Prudential. A holding 
that would restrict the right of these third parties to invoke 
arbitration because they had not signed Form U-4 would 
essentially require the NASD and the applicants to seek 
explicit textual recognition of all intended beneficiaries, 
whether known or unknown. We think such a requirement 
would frustrate the purpose and text of Form U-4 and 
accordingly hold that Prudential may properly seek 
enforcement of the arbitration clause against the plaintiffs. 
 
This case is distinguishable from Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. 
Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 
583 (1996), where we held that a non-signatory parent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In fact, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires brokers and 
dealers to register with, and submit to the rules of, the NASD as a 
condition to trading in securities. 15 U.S.C. S 78o(b)(8). 
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corporation cannot "by reason of their corporate 
relationship" enforce an arbitration clause, signed by a 
wholly-owned subsidiary, absent an express agreement to 
that effect. Id. at 1297. In Dayhoff, unlike the scenario 
before us, there was no unambiguous expression of intent 
between the parties to the arbitration agreement to create 
a class of intended beneficiaries who might invoke 
arbitration. Id. at 1296-97. In addition, the Dayhoff panel 
was particularly concerned that the non-signatory parent 
corporation had essentially created an "option to accept or 
reject the arbitration and forum selection clauses...." Id. at 
1297. The panel found that the existence of "such a choice 
belie[d] the existence of an agreement" to arbitrate. Id. Such 
is not the case here. 
 
B. The Nature of the Dispute 
 
Having found that Prudential has standing to seek 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement against the 
plaintiffs, the next step in the analysis is to identify the 
nature of the dispute at issue and the scope of the 
arbitration clause. Because arbitration clauses are 
fundamentally a creature of contract law, the critical focus 
is on a clear intention to arbitrate a specific claim or 
dispute between the parties. In the court's undertaking to 
determine the parties' intent, the analytical tools of 
ordinary contractual interpretation become relevant. First 
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) 
(citations omitted). 
 
It is important to note that the Federal Arbitration Act 
provides the authority for the enforcement of arbitration 
clauses as a matter of federal law and, as such, federal 
policies govern. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1982). The Federal 
Arbitration Act reflects a pervasive federal interest in 
promoting arbitration and encouraging courts to uphold 
arbitration clauses. See id. The underpinnings of this 
strong federal policy in favor of arbitration have been 
exhaustively reviewed by the Supreme Court, and need not 
be reiterated here. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24-26 (1991); Dean Witter 
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-220 (1985); Moses 
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H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25. However, we will emphasize 
certain settled principles of federal arbitration law that are 
relevant here. 
 
Any inquiry into the scope of an arbitration clause must 
necessarily begin with the presumption that arbitration 
applies. In considering the nature of the dispute and the 
scope of the arbitration clause, this court must operate 
under a "presumption of arbitrability in the sense that `[a]n 
order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be 
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that 
the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation 
that covers the asserted dispute.' " AT&T Technologies, 475 
U.S. at 650 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83). 
Thus, when it cannot be said "with positive assurance" that 
the parties have clearly and unequivocally excepted a 
certain dispute from arbitration, the court must compel 
arbitration. A necessary corollary of this axiomatic rule in 
favor of arbitration is that doubts in interpreting the precise 
scope of the arbitration agreement are to be resolved in 
favor of arbitration. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. While 
this approach is not a mandate for courts to ignore explicit 
textual agreements or to reshape the parties' obvious 
intent, it nevertheless weighs genuine ambiguities against 
the resisting party. Painewebber Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 
507, 512-13 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the nature of 
the disputes here in order to determine whether they fall 
within the scope of the relevant arbitration clause. The 
plaintiffs have alleged various state violations -- 
employment, contractual, and tortious in nature -- based 
on their discharge in retaliation for their refusal to 
participate in the alleged fraudulent insurance practices of 
Prudential. Several plaintiffs have also alleged RICO 
violations in which the requisite predicate acts of 
racketeering activity involve Prudential's insurance fraud. 
These plaintiffs allege that RICO standing under 18 U.S.C. 
S 1964(c) stems from the injury caused by wrongful 
employment termination. 
 
No party contests the employment nature of the plaintiffs' 
claims. Indeed, all the causes of action set forth revolve 
around the damage suffered through Prudential's decision 
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to terminate employment or intentionally interfere with the 
plaintiffs' business expectations as insurance agents. 
Unique to these claims, however, is the involvement of 
Prudential's insurance business in the dispute. The 
plaintiffs cannot recover under their various theories of 
liability without necessarily implicating the illegal nature of 
Prudential's insurance practices. To this extent, the 
grievances cited by the plaintiffs are accurately described 
as arising out of the employment or termination of 
employment, but they nevertheless implicate the legality of 
certain insurance practices. We cannot simply ignore, as 
some other courts seem to have done, the insurance 
aspects of this case. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Lindsay, 920 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App. Ct. 1996); Prudential 
Ins. Co. Of America v. Shammas, 865 F.Supp. 429, 432 
(W.D. Mich. 1993); Trumbetta v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
1994 WL 481152 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (unreported disposition). 
Rather, we identify the issues raised by the plaintiffs in 
order to determine whether they fall within the intended 
scope of arbitration. 
 
C. Scope of the Arbitration Agreement and the 
       Insurance Exception 
 
Given the nature of the dispute, we address the 
agreement embodied in Form U-4 and the NASD Code 
incorporated by reference in order to ascertain whether this 
controversy falls within the intended scope of arbitration. 
Form U-4 itself merely provides that the parties agree to 
arbitrate any dispute that is required to be arbitrated under 
the NASD Code. The Code's language is broadly drafted and 
covers: 
 
       any dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or in 
       connection with the business of any member of the 
       [NASD], or arising out of the employment or 
       termination of employment of associated person(s) with 
       any member, with the exception of disputes involving 
       the insurance business of any member which is also 
       an insurance company.... 
 
NASD Code S 1. At the very least, the section's plain 
language differentiates between two types of disputes, both 
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of which are arbitrable. There is no question that the 
parties intended to arbitrate any dispute "arising out of the 
employment or termination of employment". Beyond these 
employment disputes, claims "in connection with the 
business of members" are also within the intended scope of 
arbitration. 
 
The language of the Code carves out an exception where 
the dispute involves the "insurance business of any 
member." In these situations, there is a clear intent not to 
arbitrate but rather to leave the matter within the province 
of the courts. Less clear, however, is the coverage of this 
exception, as several ambiguities immediately arise in the 
clause's interpretation. For example, it is not clear whether 
the business of insurance exception applies to employment 
related disputes, to disputes in connection with a member's 
business, or to both.9 More importantly, neither the Code 
nor NASD by-laws defines what is meant by the "insurance 
business" and the intended scope of its coverage. 10 
 
The history of NASD Code S 1 reflects the above 
conclusions, but sheds little light on the scope of 
arbitration or the insurance business exception. Before 
1993, S 1 made the following claims eligible for arbitration: 
"any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in 
connection with the business of any member of the 
Association, with the exception of disputes involving the 
insurance business of any member which is also an 
insurance company...." 58 Fed. Reg. 39,070 (1993). At this 
point, it was clear that the insurance business exception 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We note that under settled principles of statutory construction, the 
doctrine of the last antecedent phrase would suggest that the business 
of insurance exception applies only to the phrase immediately preceding 
it which, in this case, is employment disputes. See Norma J. Singer, 
Statutes and Statutory Construction S 47.26, at 240-41 (5th ed. 1992); 
24 Words and Phrases, Last Antecedent 453-66 (1966). 
 
10. Counsel for Prudential would have us rely on such Supreme Court 
cases as Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982) which 
define the "business of insurance" for purposes of the McCarran- 
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1011 et seq. This suggestion, however, is 
beside the mark. What Congress intended by "insurance" for purposes of 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act is simply irrelevant to how the parties before 
us define insurance and the scope of disputes subject to arbitration. 
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only applied to disputes in connection with a member's 
business. The stated purpose of the exception was to: 
 
       exclude ... disputes on [the] belief that the number of 
       insurance-only claims involving insurance companies 
       is so disproportionately large in relation to their 
       securities business that to include such claims would 
       unduly burden the arbitration system. In addition, the 
       inclusion of such claims could result in a requirement 
       to arbitrate matters that are intrinsically insurance, 
       that is, matters with respect to which the Association 
       does not believe it should mandate arbitration. 
 
44 Fed. Reg. 75,255 (1979). The intent to be inferred from 
this phrase is that where the dispute is "insurance-only" or 
even "intrinsically insurance" it falls beyond the scope of 
arbitration. But apart from a stated concern regarding the 
sheer volume of insurance claims, nothing further suggests 
what is meant by an "intrinsically insurance" dispute or a 
claim that is "insurance only". 
 
In 1993, however, the NASD amended the section to 
include the phrase, "or arising out of the employment or 
termination of employment of associated person(s) with any 
member". 58 Fed. Reg. at 39,070. The stated intent behind 
this amendment was to "assure that the arbitration of 
industry employment disputes may be compelled at the 
instance of one of the parties to the dispute." Id. at 39,071. 
Moreover, the NASD intended the newly proposed clause to 
be read broadly so that employment disputes that also 
invoked matters "involving public policy issues" would still 
be arbitrated. Id. at 39,071-72. To illustrate, the 
amendment provided "that in cases involving employment 
discrimination claims or claims involving public policy 
issues, the panel should consist of a majority of public 
arbitrators." Id. at 39,071. Nevertheless, the NASD did not 
comment as to the potential interplay between the 
employment clause and the insurance business exception 
so as to illuminate the intended scope of arbitrable disputes 
in that context. 
 
As a result, we are left with an unanswered question that 
is at the heart of this case -- namely, whether employment 
disputes that implicate a member's insurance business fall 
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under the insurance business exception. On the one hand, 
it is clear, from both the language of the text and its 
history, that employment disputes were unequivocally 
intended to be arbitrated. This is so even if the employment 
claim raises policy matters well beyond the narrow legal 
issue of contract breach or ordinary employment torts. 
These would include, for instance, discrimination based on 
age, sex, or race. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 39,071. 
 
On the other hand, the NASD has expressed a clear and 
unequivocal intent not to arbitrate "insurance-only" or 
"intrinsically insurance" claims. The contours of an 
"insurance-only" or "intrinsically insurance" claim are too 
amorphous to define with precision in the present factual 
context, especially where it is the exception to a broad 
arbitration provision. We can easily imagine scenarios, such 
as the one before us, where a claimant, in order to recover 
on normally arbitrable disputes, would require the 
arbitrator to decide insurance issues. Thus, it would be 
difficult to unambiguously announce, on the basis of the 
NASD Code and its drafting history, whether the parties 
intended that these sorts of controversies are "intrinsically 
insurance" without any further indication of the meaning of 
the phrase. In the end, we are left wondering to what 
extent, if any, the desire not to arbitrate "intrinsically 
insurance" disputes was meant to override the parties' 
intention to arbitrate employment disputes -- broadly read 
-- when the controversy implicates both employment and 
insurance aspects. 
 
Courts that have grappled with this conundrum generally 
attempt to isolate certain aspects of the dispute and 
ascertain whether they pose central insurance questions. 
See, e.g., Young v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 688 A.2d 
1069, 1081 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (looking to 
whether insurance practices are "at the heart of[the] case"); 
Vitone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 943 F.Supp. 192, 198 
(D.R.I. 1996) (inquiring whether a "comprehensive 
evaluation" of the defendant's insurance business would be 
required to resolve plaintiff's claims); Wojcik v. Aetna Life 
Ins. and Annuity Co., 901 F.Supp. 1282, 1291-92 (N.D.Ill. 
1995) (requiring plaintiff to allege unlawful insurance 
practices and not merely wrongful employment conduct 
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directed toward plaintiff); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. 
Shammas, 865 F.Supp. 429, 432 (W.D.Mich. 1993) (looking 
for claims that invoke a "specific[ ]" relationship with 
insurance); Trumbetta v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1994 WL 
481152 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (unreported disposition) (looking to 
the "actual basis" of plaintiff's claim). 
 
While it is possible to construe the insurance business 
exception so that an employee's claim is "intrinsically 
insurance" or "insurance-only" once the claim requires a 
resolution of a central insurance question, such an 
interpretation fails for several reasons. Assuming that the 
business of insurance exception applies to employment 
disputes, there is nothing in the NASD Code or its drafting 
history to indicate the degree of insurance involvement in a 
dispute that would constitute an "intrinsically insurance" 
claim. Looking to the purpose behind the exception -- a 
concern for case volume -- does not aid the inquiry, as no 
party has made the contention that the types of claims 
involved here would threaten an overload on securities 
arbitrators.11 
 
If this court were to determine how the insurance 
exception applies to employment disputes, without any 
guidance as to the meaning of the phrase "intrinsically 
insurance," our decision very well might frustrate the intent 
of the parties. However, because federal arbitration law 
requires doubts to be resolved against the resisting party, 
we need not grope for a rule that would resolve the 
ambiguity here.12 Instead, we are not inclined to expand the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The district court surmised that the driving force behind the 
exception is a general lack of expertise by securities arbitrators to 
consider insurance claims. Although this may be true, neither the NASD 
Code nor its drafting history posits this as a concern to the parties. 
 
12. In fact, the text of the Code itself phrases the exception as any 
dispute "involving" the insurance business while the NASD's expression 
of purpose seems to limit the exception to "insurance-only" or 
"intrinsically insurance" claims. Because the word "involvement" 
indicates a more relaxed relationship to insurance issues than does the 
word "intrinsically" we are faced with a patent ambiguity of the parties' 
intent. Under settled contract principles, we must give effect to "all 
circumstances" behind the contractual term including "the principal 
purpose of the parties." Restatement (Second) Contracts S 202(1). 
 
                                16 
  
exception without a clear indication of the parties' purpose 
and intended scope of coverage.13 
 
We ultimately cannot say with positive assurance that 
the language of Form U-4 and the NASD Code, as well as 
their drafting histories, indicate the parties' desire not to 
arbitrate employment disputes that require the resolution 
of an insurance business issue. There is only one clear 
expression of intent here -- that employment disputes are 
subject to arbitration while "intrinsically insurance" claims 
are not. Because this court cannot say with certainty what 
is meant by "intrinsically insurance" claims, and whether it 
embraces employment disputes, our mandate is clear: a 
presumption in favor of arbitration applies and doubts in 
construction are resolved against the resisting parties. 
Thus, we will reverse the district court's ruling that the 
insurance business exception exempted the plaintiffs' 
claims from arbitration in this case.14  
 
III. Policy Grounds and Arbitration 
 
In addition to the textual interpretation of the insurance 
business exception, the district court offered another 
reason for its denial of arbitration: a concern for potential 
"inconsistent results and inefficiencies" given the dozens of 
putative class actions against Prudential. Although the 
court recognized that this factor alone cannot justify a 
reformation of a binding arbitration contract, it 
nevertheless considered the peculiar class action 
ramifications as a persuasive factor against committing the 
disputes to an arbitration forum. 
 
While we share the district court's apprehension toward 
inconsistent results and inefficiencies caused by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Indeed, if this text were a statute, the ordinary canons of statutory 
interpretation would mandate a narrow construction of the exception in 
the presence of ambiguity. See Norma J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction S 47.11 (5th ed. 1992). 
 
14. With respect to the plaintiffs' RICO cause of action, we note that the 
Supreme Court has already approved arbitration of RICO claims 
pursuant to a pre-existing arbitration agreement. See Shearson / 
 American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
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arbitration, we cannot frustrate the enforcement of the 
arbitration clause pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act 
on the basis of this concern. As the Supreme Court noted 
in Moses H. Cone: 
 
       [F]ederal law requires piecemeal resolution when 
       necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement. 
       Under the Arbitration Act, an arbitration agreement 
       must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of 
       other persons who are parties to the underlying 
       dispute but not to the arbitration agreement. 
 
460 U.S. at 20 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
Although the Court in Moses H. Cone considered the 
possibilities of duplicative and piecemeal litigation in terms 
of federal abstention doctrine, the interest in enforcing 
federal arbitration law is the same in other situations. See, 
e.g., Barrowclough, 752 F.2d at 938 (holding that an 
arbitration clause against certain parties may be enforced 
even if other parties were not subject to arbitration); 
Dayhoff, 86 F.3d at 1298 (enforcing an arbitration clause 
even if a party may have to "litigate its claims in three 
different fora with three different sets of rules"). 
 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, 
specifically rejected the view that arbitration was improper 
when multi-district litigation may create duplicative 
litigation and a potential for inconsistency. In re Piper 
Funds, Inc., Institutional Government Income Portfolio Litig., 
71 F.3d 298, 303 (8th Cir. 1995). As the Supreme Court 
broadly stated, the Federal Arbitration Act was "motivated, 
first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce 
agreements into which parties had entered, and we must 
not ... allow the fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient 
dispute resolution to overshadow the underlying 
motivation." Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213, 220 (1985) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we will also 
reverse the district court's ruling based on judicial 
efficiency and consistency. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court 
will be reversed, to the extent it denied Prudential's motion 
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compelling arbitration, and the matter will be remanded for 
further appropriate proceedings. 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. 
 
While I agree with the majority that Prudential may seek 
enforcement of the arbitration clause, I respectfully dissent 
from its conclusion that the plaintiffs' claims are subject to 
arbitration. I will set forth my reasons briefly. The NASD 
Code, following its 1993 amendment, reads as follows: 
 
       This Code . . . is prescribed . . . for the arbitration of 
       any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in 
       connection with the business of any member of the 
       Association, or [dispute, claim  or controversy] arising 
       out of the employment or termination of employment of 
       associated person(s) with any member, with the 
       exception of disputes involving the insurance business 
       of any member which is also an insurance company 
       . . . 
 
The underscored words were added in 1993 and I have 
inserted "dispute, claim or controversy" within them for 
clarity because obviously arbitration is of a dispute, claim 
or controversy. 
 
Prudential, which contends that the insurance exception 
is inapplicable in an employment dispute, see br. at 18, 
effectively would rewrite the Code so that it reads as 
follows: 
 
       This Code . . . is prescribed . . . for the arbitration of 
       any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in 
       connection with the business of any member of the 
       Association, with the exception of disputes involving 
       the insurance business of any member which is also 
       an insurance company, or [for the arbitration of any 
       dispute, claim or controversy] arising out of the 
       employment or termination of employment of 
       associated person(s) with any member. 
 
I say that Prudential would rewrite the Code to read as I 
have indicated because the rewritten version renders the 
exception for "disputes involving the insurance business" 
inapplicable in disputes arising out of employment or its 
termination. Relying on its rewritten version of the Code, 
Prudential explains that "[o]nly disputes predicated directly 
on Prudential's contractual or other insurance-related 
 
                                20 
  
obligations to policyholders, rather than its role and 
obligations as an employer, properly fall within the scope of 
the business of insurance exception." Br. at 3. 
 
Prudential's position is untenable. I am well aware that 
the courts look generously at the scope of arbitration 
clauses. Nevertheless, except in certain situations in which 
statutes require arbitration, a party only need arbitrate 
disputes which he or she agrees to arbitrate. Dayhoff Inc. v. 
H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
117 S.Ct. 583 (1996). In my view, it is perfectly clear that 
the exception from arbitration for disputes involving the 
insurance business must apply to employment disputes 
because the exception directly follows the provision for their 
arbitration. While it could be argued that the exception 
does not apply to disputes "arising out of or in connection 
with the business of any member of the Association," as 
that phrase is more remote than the employment disputes 
provision from the exception, it cannot be argued tenably 
that the exception jumps over the immediately preceding 
employment disputes provision to modify only the more 
remote phrase. It is one thing to construe a contract to 
require the arbitration of a dispute. But it is quite another 
to rewrite a contract to require arbitration. A court simply 
cannot do that. 
 
The majority indicates that "[t]he plaintiffs cannot recover 
under their various theories of liability without necessarily 
implicating the illegal nature of Prudential's insurance 
practices." Majority Opinion at 12. The majority thus sets 
forth that "the grievances cited by the plaintiffs are 
accurately described as arising out of the employment or 
termination of employment, but they nevertheless implicate 
the legality of certain insurance practices." Id. at 12. I agree 
with these points and thus I would affirm because the 
obligation to arbitrate employment disputes excludes 
"disputes involving the insurance business of any member 
which is also an insurance company." (Emphasis added.) 
Indeed, I regard this case as fairly straightforward. After all, 
a dispute implicating the legality of insurance practices 
surely is a dispute involving an employer's insurance 
business. 
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The majority concludes that there must be arbitration 
here in part because of ambiguities in the Code. It indicates 
that "it is not clear whether the business of insurance 
exception applies to employment related disputes, to 
disputes in connection with a member's business, or to 
both," id. at 13, and that is uncertain "whether employment 
disputes that implicate a member's insurance business fall 
under the insurance business exception." Id. at 14-15. I 
respectfully disagree because as I have indicated the 
provision for arbitration of employment disputes directly 
precedes the insurance business exception. 
 
The majority expresses concern about the scope of the 
insurance business exception. I certainly agree that the 
scope could be a problem if the insurance business aspects 
of the dispute are tangential to the main controversy. But 
in this case insurance disputes are at the heart of the 
controversies for, as the majority points out, the plaintiffs 
"cannot recover . . . without necessarily implicating the 
illegal nature of Prudential's insurance practices" and the 
plaintiffs' grievances, though arising out of the employment 
or its termination, "nevertheless implicate the legality of 
certain insurance practices." Id. at 12. Indeed, if the 
exception to the obligation to arbitrate employment 
controversies for disputes involving the insurance business 
is inapplicable here, it is difficult to understand when it 
ever would be applicable. 
 
I respect the majority's point concerning the presumption 
in favor of arbitration and, as I have indicated, I am aware 
that in cases of doubt it is appropriate to order arbitration. 
But to me this case is fairly clear and the generalized policy 
in favor of arbitration cannot overcome the plain meaning 
of the Code. 
 
I also point out that the New Jersey state courts would 
resolve this case differently. In Young v. Prudential Ins. Co., 
688 A.2d 1069 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 
694 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1997), the Superior Court of New 
Jersey, Appellate Division, construed the same Code 
provision involved here to permit an action in court in a 
similar case. In fact, Young found the district court opinion 
in this very case to be "compelling" and followed it. Id. at 
1079. Accordingly, I have no doubt that the New Jersey 
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state courts will follow Young and not this case. See Dewey 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1244 (N.J. 
1990) (holding that "decisions of a lower federal court are 
no more binding on a state court than they are on a federal 
court not beneath it in the judicial hierarchy") (citation 
omitted). It thus appears that in New Jersey the 
determination of whether there will be arbitration in 
controversies of the nature involved here, even against the 
same employer, now will depend on whether a state or 
federal court makes the determination. 
 
In sum, I conclude that the district court opinion at In re: 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 924 F. 
Supp. 627, 640-42 (D.N.J. 1996), is right on the mark as is 
the opinion of the state court in Young, 688 A.2d 1069. 
Thus, I would affirm. 
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